Damascus & the SDF: A Deal in Peril

Update: in a video statement to anadolou agancy 30 June, US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack "urged sdf to merge militarily and politically with the Syrian government, warning that the US government will deal with only one party: the legitimate Syrian government."

The Syrian people did not hide their joy after the March 10 agreement between President Ahmad Al-Sharaa and the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Celebratory marches broke out in areas controlled by both sides. But soon after, that joy began to fade as the agreement stalled, accusations of stalling emerged, government supporters were pursued in SDF-held areas, and pessimism spread about the deal’s implementation—scheduled to be completed by year’s end. So, what happened?

The Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud Agreement

On April 1, the two parties signed an agreement for the SDF to withdraw from the Aleppo districts of Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud toward the eastern Euphrates. Syria’s Ministry of Interior was to assume security through local centers in each neighborhood, accompanied by a prisoner exchange.

While military withdrawals, exchanges, and road openings were documented, the agreement’s execution abruptly stopped. The neighborhoods remain under SDF control, and the Ministry still does not exert authority there. A similar failure occurred with the Tishrin Dam handover, which also remains under SDF control.

SDF’s Media Campaign and Disinformation

The delays coincided with public statements by Syrian Democratic Council officials raising demands not in the original agreement, including federalism, constitutional amendments recognizing Kurdish identity, and maintaining the SDF’s distinct structure instead of integrating into Syria’s Ministry of Defense.

In response, the Syrian Presidency issued a statement on April 27 rejecting “attempts to impose divisive realities under terms like federalism or self-rule without national consensus.” It also voiced concerns about demographic change, disruption of state institutions, monopolization of resources, and threats to national sovereignty.

Disarmament and SDF Maneuvering

Despite the presidency’s stance, SDF leaders continued to call for decentralization, while also accusing the government of ethnic persecution, security incompetence, and accepting alleged “terrorists” into the army after the U.S. approved the inclusion of some 3,000 Turkistani fighters into the Syrian Ministry of Defense.

General Mazloum Abdi, SDF’s commander, stated on May 31 that he supports the agreement with President Al-Sharaa and wants “one Syrian army” but still advocated for decentralization. He also expressed willingness to meet Turkish President Erdoğan—referencing a past agreement with PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan to lay down arms—but emphasized that such matters are Turkish domestic issues, not binding on the SDF.

Meanwhile, the SDF invited Kurdish parties—including the Kurdish National Council—to a “Unity of Word” conference and agreed to send a united delegation to Damascus solely to negotiate decentralization and constitutional amendments. Damascus, however, refused to receive the delegation, especially after their provocative remarks.

Simultaneously, the SDF issued a decision to rehabilitate Qamishli Airport for flights—an act viewed as provocative by the government, which responded with a civil aviation authority statement declaring the airport could not operate without official approval.

U.S.-Turkish Position

After President Trump announced plans to lift sanctions on Syria and met with President Al-Sharaa in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. began withdrawing its forces from northeastern Syria, planning to retain only one base in Hasakah.

American troops accompanied Syrian government forces on visits to ISIS family camps and detention centers to facilitate their transfer from SDF to Syrian government control. U.S. officials—including Admiral Brad Cooper CENTCOM nominee for leadership and Trump’s Syria envoy Tom Barrack—confirmed that America views President Al-Sharaa as a key ally in the fight against ISIS.

President Erdoğan, after meeting Trump at the NATO summit on June 24–25, said he raised the issue of the SDF in Syria and reiterated Turkey’s rejection of any plans for federalism or partition.

Where Are Things Headed?

All indications on the ground suggest the SDF is preparing for a possible military confrontation to defend its territory:

- Rapid tunnel construction. 

- Recruiting additional fighters, including from Syria’s coastal regions.  

- Targeting government supporters in its areas.  

- Repeating decentralization rhetoric and refusing integration into the Syrian army except as a unified bloc in its current zones.

- compete with the Syrian government on strategic wheat crop.

Meanwhile, the Syrian government has remained silent, focusing instead on strengthening ties with the U.S. in hopes of joint American-Turkish pressure on the SDF to implement the deal and avoid an armed conflict—one that Kurds appear ready for if the deal collapses by year’s end.

Moumin sawady