Kurdish SDF & Israel test American support umbrella for Syria's new government

SDF File

“Betrayal of the American ally” was one of the most circulated phrases in Kurdish media and among Kurdish activists, as they watched their dreams of political decentralization in northeastern Syria collapse before the rapid and shocking advance of the Syrian army into areas that had remained under their control without dispute for at least ten years, backed by absolute American economic and military support.

The American reaction to the battle opened by the Syrian army in two Aleppo neighborhoods, which ended at the borders of Hasakah city in the northeast, did not go beyond calls for restraint, negotiation, and urgency in transferring ISIS prisoners to Iraq, fearing their escape.

Meanwhile, the SDF commander signed the January 18 agreement, handing over government security control of oil and gas fields, border crossings, and the cities of Hasakah, Qamishli, and Ayn al-Arab/Kobani (under a certain military-security integration). The political and media uproar reached the American president, who finally called President Shar’a and urged him to stop the army’s entry into Hasakah, according to American sources.

Except for Senator Lindsey Graham’s threat of severe sanctions like Caesar, through a draft law, he promised to present to Congress, along with sympathy from other members of Congress toward the “Kurdish ally,” the Americans in reality had no real leverage over the Syrian president, especially after he signed Decree No. 13 on “Kurdish rights,” for several reasons:

1- The March 10 agreement between the SDF and the Syrian government expired without real progress (other than reducing military clashes to a minimum from March until the end of 2025), which theoretically and practically gave the Syrian government the green light to restore sovereignty, even by force, over provinces east of the Euphrates.

2- The Syrian government’s urgent need for energy fields in the region, wheat fields, and border crossings to drive development, reconstruction, and halt support coming to the SDF from Iraqi Kurdistan.

3- The exposure of the SDF’s evasiveness before allies and enemies alike, negotiating only to negotiate and buy time without offering meaningful concessions, relying on assumed American support. One American diplomat expressed this evasiveness when he told SDF leaders: “Why do you always agree today to yesterday’s deal?” President Ahmad Shar’a echoed this in his canceled interview with a Kurdish channel, saying: “The French called and asked us to stop fighting to withdraw SDF fighters from Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods, we agreed, but the fighters refused! Then the Americans called and asked for the same withdrawal in three stages, we agreed, but the SDF refused, so they finally withdrew only by military force.”

4- The SDF leadership lost its bet on Arab tribal forces within its ranks and failed to read the fundamental change in the American position since President Trump took office, with his strong support for President Ahmad Shar’a, even receiving him personally at the White House. They assumed nothing had changed, that repeated American requests for their integration with Assad’s government in the past were the same requests for integration with Shar’a’s government today, that they would enjoy the same American military protection, and that their control of energy fields the government desperately needed gave them extra leverage. They believed President Shar’a had no choice but to grant them decentralized administration of eastern Euphrates under their leadership.

The outgoing Biden administration hastily arranged a meeting between President Shar’a and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi to sign the March 10 agreement, a clear message to the SDF that the incoming administration would not provide the same protection. Trump’s administration, which ordered the withdrawal of American forces from Syria in 2019, would repeat the move. But the Kurds reassured themselves with external (Israeli) assurances of an imminent collapse of the nascent Syrian authority, misjudged the situation, and paid dearly for their mistake.

Israeli File

President Shar’a chose to deal with repeated Israeli aggression against Syrian lands and forces directly rather than through intermediaries, recognizing the absence of any real external influence on the Israeli government, especially after the October 7, 2023, attack, except for U.S. influence.

Marathon negotiations between the two governments froze over a sharp disagreement: the Syrian government demanded a security agreement based on the 1974 disengagement accord, requiring Israeli army withdrawal from all occupied territories after Assad’s fall, cessation of military attacks, and abstention from supporting Druze militias in Suwayda. Israel, however, firmly rejected withdrawal from Mount Hermon, insisted on supporting the Druze, demanded a buffer zone, maintained freedom of military action over Syrian skies, and even demanded a peace agreement on top of that. But something changed after President Shar’a’s visit to the White House, which the Israeli prime minister described by saying: “The Syrian president returned from the White House arrogant.”

The results of the visit were revealed through press leaks from American officials about strong pressure from President Trump to finalize a deal between the two sides, sending envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff to a meeting of the Syrian and Israeli delegations in Paris, which reportedly achieved about 90% agreement on disputed issues.

The next meeting in Paris approaches amid a regional war atmosphere against Iran, with the Americans needing regional consensus and support for the battle if it erupts, and Israel’s urgent need for this war possibly pushing it to concessions in several files, including the Syrian one.

Other Regional Files

The American president posted on his social platform (truth social) that the nomination of Nouri al-Maliki by (Shiite framework parliamant group) for Iraq’s premiership was a bad decision.

The post came after Trump’s call with President Shar’a about the Kurdish situation in Syria, which some linked to speculation that Syria asked the American president to prevent al-Maliki—known for his hostile stance toward Syrian leadership—from assuming Iraq’s premiership.

After widespread speculation, al-Maliki appeared in a recorded interview calling President Shar’a “brother,” a shocking reversal of his previously declared positions, sparking a storm of anger, humor, and ridicule across social media in both Iraq and Syria.

In the same context, U.S. envoy to Syria Ambassador Tom Barrack hinted last year at the possibility of handing the Lebanese file to Syria after negotiations with Israel stalled.

These statements clearly showed American openness to Syria’s return of influence in Lebanon, even to the extent of geographic incorporation into Syrian authority, prompting Lebanese media attacks on the envoy’s stance, while Lebanese activists split between welcoming the idea of annexation and opposing it.

Whatever the speculations or opinions, what is certain today is that the new Syrian government enjoys historic American support unlikely to be repeated.

One year of Trump’s administration has passed, with three remaining. These three years are a historic opportunity for the new Syrian government not only to organize its internal affairs but also, confidently, to extend external influence beyond anything Syria has experienced in its history since independence.

The question remains: will the Syrian leadership succeed in exploiting this American support umbrella to achieve maximum benefit? The next three years will provide the answer.

Moumin sawady

Syria news report